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INTRODUCTION
Despite the incredible potential of engineered nanomate-rials to advance cleaner, safer technology, emergingdata continue to indicate serious potential for harm to
human health and ecological systems. Nanoscale materials, engi-
neered to be one to one hundred nanometers (“nm”), currently
have a number of commercial applications, from high-capacity
computer drives to food packaging, shampoos, sunscreens, and
cosmetics. The word “nanos,” from the Greek word for “dwarf,”
indicates 10-9, or one-billionth. Nanometer-sized materials are
one-billionth of a meter in size; larger than atoms, but much
smaller than a cell. As a comparison, there are as many nanome-
ters in an inch as there are inches in four hundred miles
(25,344,000). The width of a human hair is 80,000 nm. 
Scientists predict that these
submicroscopic nanoparticles,
or ultra-fine particles, will give
rise to new cancer therapies,
pollution-neutralizing com-
pounds, more durable con-
sumer products, advanced
detectors for such biohazards as
anthrax, and higher-efficiency
fuel cells, among other things.
These predictions are due to the
unique properties of nanoscale
materials compared with their
normal-size counterparts.1
However, laboratory studies
already warn that nanoparticles can cause inflammation, dam-
age brain cells, and cause pre-cancerous lesions. Early research
also has found that nanoparticles easily pass through body tis-
sues from one area of the body to another. Responsible regula-
tion and oversight will be needed to prevent harmful exposures. 
Beyond some basic experimental data on cells and in ani-
mals, there is very little known about the toxicity of nanomate-
rials. For example, we know nothing about whether nanomate-
rials in products such as cosmetics and shampoos penetrate the
skin, or vaporize or off-gas from consumer products. When con-
sidering the potential for harmful effects from nanomaterials,
there are two lines of evidence that are helpful: first, what is
known from well-conducted scientific tests published in the
peer-reviewed journals; and second, what can be extrapolated
from the substantial data on the harmful effects of ultrafine par-
ticulate air pollution. 
SMALL SIZE, BIG RISKS
Carbon-based nanomaterials, such as miniscule carbon
cylinders called nanotubes and tiny carbon spheres called buck-
yballs, have desirable electrical, mechanical, and thermal prop-
erties, useful for such applications as developing strong, light-
weight building and packing materials, computers, and aero-
space engineering. However, the data thus far indicate that
exposure to various carbon nanomaterials may be harmful to the
brain, lung, cardiovascular, and immune systems. Carbon nan-
otubes tend to cluster into “ropes,” acting more like fibers than
particles when inhaled, giving rise to lung inflammation and
granulomas (clusters of cells with injury or inflammation) that
may form scar tissue (fibrosis). Nanotubes are also insoluble
and cannot be broken down by the body’s natural processes. 
Single-walled carbon nanotubes (“SWCNTs”) have been
reported by five different research groups to be associated with
lung toxicity.2 Government researchers from the National
Institute of Occupational Safety
and Health (“NIOSH”) reported
rapid lung inflammation, rapid
progressive fibrosis, and granu-
lomas within seven days after a
single dose of SWCNTs into the
lungs of mice.3 Cell damage
increased in a dose-dependent
manner by one day after expo-
sure. One year earlier, DuPont
researchers had reported acute
lung toxicity and transient
inflammation in rats associated
with a single dose of SWCNTs
of either 1 or 5 mg/kg adminis-
tered into the upper lung.4 That
same year, a collaboration between the National Air and Space
Administration (“NASA”) and the University of Texas reported
dose-dependent granulomas and inflammation in mice that were
administered a single dose of either 0.1 or 0.5 mg of single-
walled carbon nanotubes into the lungs, roughly equivalent to a
mouse inhaling nanotubes for about three and a half workdays
(low dose) or seventeen workdays (high dose) at the workplace
standard for graphite dust. 5
Despite these data, and the lack of complete safety testing,
a major supplier of carbon nanotubes, Carbon Nanotechnolo-
gies, Inc., has registered its product under the Toxic Substances
Control Act (“TSCA”) as a synthetic graphite. Workplace haz-
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ard labels or material safety data sheets reference the work-
place permissible exposure limits for graphite (15 mg/m3 of
total dust, and 5 mg/m3 for the breathable fraction).6 Scientists
have warned that workers breathing nanotube dust at a fraction
of the workplace allowable level “would likely develop serious
lung lesions.”7
Nanomaterials can also be composed of metal atoms.
Examples include nanogold, nanosilver, silicon nanowires, reac-
tive metal oxides such as nanotitanium dioxide, and quantum
dots – a closely packed semiconductor crystal with unique opti-
cal and light-emitting properties. Evidence suggests that metal-
based nanomaterials can cause damage to humans and the envi-
ronment. In 2005, researchers from the New Jersey Institute of
Technology reported that the root growth of corn, cucumbers,
cabbage, carrots, and soybeans was stunted after a 24-hour
exposure to high doses (2 mg/mL) of alumina nanoparticles in
water.8 Alumina nanoparticles currently are used in scratch- and
abrasion-resistant coatings on commercial products such as
safety glasses, car finishes, and flooring. Researchers from the
University of California at San Diego reported that cadmium-
selenium core semiconductor (quantum) dots used in biological
imaging were acutely toxic to liver cells in a Petri dish at doses
typically used for imaging.9 The dots are replacing traditional
imaging with fluorescent dyes, due to their enhanced and
longer-lasting brightness. 
University of Rochester investigators reported in 2000 that
nano-teflon fumes (about 16 nm) were much more acutely toxic
than Teflon, the popular brand name for polytetrafluoroethyl-
ene, when inhaled for only fifteen minutes by rodents, and rap-
idly passed through epithelial tissues to other parts of the body,
inducing severe inflammation, edema, and hemorrhage of lungs
within hours after exposure.10 In 1992, University of Rochester
investigators examined the effects of exposure to nano titanium
dioxide (TiO2; 20 nm), a material in sunscreen. The study
showed that rodents that inhaled ultra-fine TiO2 for three
months, under conditions simulating occupational exposures
(six hours/day, five days/week), had significantly more lung
inflammation and scar tissue compared with those that inhaled
larger TiO2 particles (250 nm).11
HEEDING THE RED FLAGS
Although there is a paucity of toxicity data on nanomateri-
als per se, the hazards of nano-sized (ultra-fine) air pollution are
well-documented. Particulate matter less than 10 micrometers
(PM10; 10,000 nm) is linked to increased disease and death from
lung cancer and cardiopulmonary disease.12 These diseases are
more closely linked with exposure to smaller particles than to
larger-sized ones.13 The risks are especially high among sensi-
tive individuals, such as those with pre-existing conditions of
the heart and lungs, including asthma and chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease.14
Some of the acute toxicity of ultra-fine particles is likely
due to their larger surface-area–to-mass ratio, ability to pene-
trate biological tissues, and their increased biopersistance com-
pared with larger particles of the same composition.15 Given
these characteristics and the results of targeted studies such as
those mentioned above, the potential for harmful effects from
widespread use of nanomaterials must be taken seriously.
MISALLOCATION OF FEDERAL SPENDING
Despite these early warnings, government response thus far
to the potential risks has been woefully inadequate. In spring
2005, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology issued its five year review of the interagency
National Nanotechnology Initiative, established in 1991 to
direct federal research activities on nanotechnology.16 Although
the text of the report is 46 pages long, the section addressing
“Environmental, Health and Safety” does not appear until page
35 and is less than one page long. According to the Project on
Emerging Nanotechnologies at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, only four percent of the fiscal
year (“FY”) 2006 federal nanotechnology funding was ear-
marked for research on health and environmental effects, and
another four percent on social implications and education.17
Meanwhile, federal funding for nanotechnology research and
development has soared from $464 million in 2001 to $1.2 bil-
lion in FY 2007.18 Of this investment, the National Science
Foundation will get $373 million. More than $600 million is
earmarked for the U.S. Departments of Defense ($345 million)
and Energy ($258 million). By comparison, only $142 million is
slated for the human health and environment protection branch-
es of the federal government, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) ($9 million), and the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services ($133 million), which includes the
National Institutes of Health. With this disparity in funding pri-
orities, it is hard to imagine how safety testing could ever catch
up with research and development.
Some federal agencies are addressing the potential down-
side of nanotechnology. The Department of Health and Human
Services’ National Toxicology Program is researching potential
health risks. In addition, NIOSH is developing a “best practices”
document on handling nanoparticles in the workplace to reduce
risks. In FY 2005 the EPA awarded $4 million for research on
nanotechnology impacts on human health and the environment.
However, much more needs to be done to better understand the
potential risks of nanotechnologies. 
RESPONSE BY INDUSTRY AND ITS FINANCIERS
The private sector response to potential health and environ-
ment threats has been mixed. Some corporations seem con-
cerned only about public perception and hope to disavow actu-
al risk by avoiding safety testing, keeping safety data confiden-
tial, and providing empty reassurances to the public. Fearing
actual or perceived risks, insurance companies such as Swiss
Re,19 and financial investment advisers such as Innovest20 and
Allianz,21 have called for safety testing and regulatory oversight
of nanomaterials. Other large corporations and many small start-
up companies also would welcome safety testing and regula-
tions if they were not overly costly or burdensome, because they
would contribute to market stability by reducing future risks of
liabilities and consumer rejection. 
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REGULATORY BLIND SPOT
Unfortunately, existing environmental laws render federal
agencies ill-equipped to regulate the nanotech industry.22 TSCA,
enacted by Congress in 1976 to gather information about chem-
ical substances and control those deemed dangerous to the pub-
lic or the environment, is the most obvious candidate for regu-
lating nanomaterials. But TSCA lacks an effective means of
requiring companies to provide risk data, and it places the bur-
den on the government to demonstrate unacceptable risk before
it can adopt regulatory restrictions of any kind. 
In response to a proposal by the EPA for a voluntary pro-
gram to “regulate” nanomaterials,23 in June 2005, Natural
Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) and other public interest
groups urged the EPA to identify all engineered nanomaterials
as “new chemical substances” under TSCA because they meet
the standard of “organic or inorganic substance[s] of a particu-
lar molecular identity.”24 This would trigger TSCA section 5
pre-manufacture notice (“PMN”) reporting requirements prior
to the commercial manufacture
or import of nanomaterials.25
The U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office issued more than 8,600
nanotechnology-related patents
in 2003,26 suggesting that at
least one arm of the govern-
ment already considers these
materials to be new.
In addition to PMN report-
ing, the 2005 NRDC comments
urged the EPA to issue test rules
under TSCA’s section 4 by
waiving the regulatory production volume thresholds that other-
wise would not be triggered by the miniscule product volume of
nanomaterials.27 The groups also called for regulations under
TSCA’s section 6, requiring the EPA to prohibit or limit anyone
manufacturing, importing, processing, distributing in commerce,
using, or disposing of a chemical if there is a reasonable basis to
conclude the chemical presents, or will present, an “unreasonable
risk of injury to health or the environment.” Tragically, the EPA
has failed to regulate any new chemical using the TSCA’s section
6 authority since that provision was gutted by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the 1991 case Corrosion Proof
Fittings v. EPA (rejecting the EPA’s application of the TSCA’s
section six to asbestos).28 The court’s decision and subsequent
problematic EPA interpretations of that decision make it extraor-
dinarily difficult for the agency to adopt regulations under sec-
tion 6 of TSCA. Thus, NRDC stated that “while requiring [pre-
manufacture notice], issuing test rules, and promulgating regula-
tions under TSCA are necessary steps for nanomaterials, such
actions will be insufficient to protect public health and the envi-
ronment. Ultimately, additional legislative action by Congress,
the states, and potentially the courts will be necessary to ensure
that nanomaterials are adequately addressed.”29
Other laws also are inadequate. For example, the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) leaves all cosmetics essen-
tially unregulated, and the chronically under-enforced
Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) does not ade-
quately protect worker health. Thus, neither the FDCA nor the
OSHA is viable as a vehicle for protecting the public. Other
environmental statutes are similarly ill-equipped to address
nanomaterials – for example, these materials would be effec-
tively unregulated under the Clean Air Act due to very small
production quantities.
VOLUNTARY SAFETY TESTING IS NOT ENOUGH
In response to the lack of a regulatory framework for nan-
otechnology, the EPA is developing a voluntary program that will
ask nanomaterial producers to submit basic information on mate-
rial characterization, toxicity, exposure potential, and risk man-
agement practices. A company would then be able to advertise its
participation as a means of dispelling public fears about its prod-
uct. A more in-depth level of participation would generate more
detailed risk information. NRDC participated in an ad-hoc work-
ing group with industry, academic, and public interest groups to
advise the EPA on a general
framework for such a program. 
While this program poten-
tially would fill a gap in the
absence of real regulations, it is
severely limited in several impor-
tant ways. Participation is not
mandatory, and would only
include those products that par-
ticipating companies choose to
disclose. Those companies with
the riskiest products, as well as
those with poor business ethics,
are unlikely to participate. The program also lacks punitive
measures; it will do little more than gather data – primarily
industry-generated data, which experience has shown are less
likely than data from the government or independent studies to
report products’ harmful effects.30 In the past, industries have
gone to great lengths to downplay the health risks of asbestos,
lead, vinyl chloride, and other toxic materials, only to have them
lead to devastating occupational and public health consequences. 
EPA’S WHITE PAPER RECOMMENDATIONS
In December 2005 the EPA issued the “External Draft
Nanotechnology White Paper”31 which made the following rea-
sonable suggestions as first steps forward:
• Support approaches to promote pollution prevention,
sustainable resource use, and good product steward-
ship in the production and use of nanomaterials;
• Support and undertake research on human health and
ecological impacts of nanomaterials;
• Conduct case studies on the risks and information
gaps of specific nanomaterials;
• Expand collaborations on the potential human and
environmental health implications;




impotent to regulate the
nanotech industry.
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information and regulatory activities; and
• Expand efforts to train agency scientists and man-
agers about the potential environmental applications
and implications of nanotechnologies.
PUBLIC INTEREST GROUP RESPONSES
An array of good stewardship approaches to nanotechnolo-
gy development would increase public confidence and market
stability. In NRDC comments to the EPA, signed by twenty
other public interest groups, including Greenpeace
International, the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth,
Environmental Working Group, ETC group, and Silicon Valley
Toxics Coalition, the organizations insisted that the federal gov-
ernment take action on the following initiatives:32
• Prevent uses of nanomaterials that may result in
human exposures or environmental releases unless
reasonable assurances of safety are demonstrated
beforehand;
• Label products that contain nanomaterials or are
made with processes that use nanomaterials;
• Publicly disclose information on potential risks; 
• Include toxicity information about nanomaterials on
workplace hazard labels;
• Increase safety testing conducted by independent or
government laboratories subject to “sunshine laws”
that allow public access to information; and
• Conduct comprehensive assessment of the environ-
mental and human health concerns that may arise
across the life-cycle – including production, use, and
disposal – of nanotech products. 
CONCLUSION
While we know enough to want to avoid exposure to nano-
materials and releases into the environment, many issues need to
be further studied. For example, we do not know much about
how these materials harm our health over a lifetime of exposure;
long-term effects have not been studied in experimental animal
tests. While ingestion and skin penetration are potential routes
of exposure, most studies have only tried to mimic inhalation.
The majority of toxicological studies with nanomaterials have
been in vitro (such as skin cell toxicity), or short-term animal
studies. We do not know whether these materials penetrate
through our skin, even though consumers use shampoos, cos-
metics, and other household products with nanomaterial ingre-
dients. We do not know if nanomaterials are aerosolized and
then inhaled when we use shampoos with nano-ingredients. We
do not know whether ingestion results in toxicity, although we
have nanomaterials in food packaging and even in chocolate
chewing gum. We know that toxicity of inhaled particles seems
to increase as the particle size becomes smaller, but we lack effi-
cient and cost-effective ways to measure the size distribution of
airborne particles. 
Many other questions remain unanswered. For example, we
do not know the extent to which nanomaterials can penetrate the
placenta and transfer from mother to baby. In addition, we are
unaware whether nanomaterials are released from products
when they are incinerated, buried, or degraded over time. These
uncertainties indicate that a necessary first step to effective nan-
otechnology regulation will require investing in studies to eval-
uate the risks, as well as the benefits, of nanomaterials on
human health and the environment. 
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